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Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to provide criteria for a central bank of how to
choose among di¤erent monetary-policy rules when caring about a number of policy
targets such as the output gap and expected ination. Special attention is given
to the question if policy instruments are predetermined or only forward looking.
Using the new-Keynesian Phillips curve with a cost-push-shock policy-transmission
mechanism, the forward-looking case implies an extreme lack of robustness and
of credibility of stabilization policy. The backward-looking case is such that the
simple-rule parameters can be the solution of Ramsey optimal policy under limited
commitment. As a consequence, we suggest to model explicitly the rational behav-
ior of the policy maker with Ramsey optimal policy, rather than to use simple rules
with an ambiguous assumption leading to policy advice that is neither robust nor
credible.
JEL classication numbers: B22, B23, B41, C52, E31, O41, O47.
Keywords: Determinacy, Proportional Feedback Rules, Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium, Ramsey Optimal Policy under Quasi-Commitment.
1 Introduction
Throughout the years, a large number of policy rules for the central bank have been
proposed. The aim of the present paper is to provide criteria of how to choose among
these di¤erent rules and how to decide in the mathematical modeling whether the policy
instrument should be dened as forward looking or predetermined and its relation to
the policy target. In this context, we will compare simple rules with a predetermined
policy instrument, simple rules with a forward-looking instrument, and Ramsey optimal
policy with quasi commitment in a model with the new-Keynesian Phillips curve as the
transmission mechanism (Gali (2015). Special importance is given to the problem of
robustness and the existence of bifurcations.
In a rst part it will be argued that one cannot deduce from a proportional simple
feedback rule, i.e. a rule in which the instrument is a linear function of the deviations of
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the policy targets from their long-run equilibrium, that the policy instrument is necessarily
a forward-looking variable if the policy target is a forward-looking variable. An example of
a simple rule is given in Leeper (1991) where the Central Banks short-term interest rate
responds linearly to ination deviations. A variable is forward-looking in an equation
not derived from intertemporal optimization, such as a proportional feedback rule, if
two conditions are satised: Firstly, the variable should depend on its own expectations,
and not only on the expectations of other variables. Secondly, these expectations should
not be driven by adaptive expectations. Because these simple proportional rules do not
include the expectations of the policy instrument itself, one cannot claim it is obvious that
the policy instrument is a forward-looking variable.
This assumption matters a lot for policy recommendation. Simple rule theorists solve
their model imposing Blanchard and Kahns (1980) determinacy condition following an
algorithm in three steps (Leeper (1991)):
Firstly, they count the number of predetermined variables.
Secondly, the found number implies the number of stable eigenvalues inside the unit
circle for discrete-time models.
Thirdly, the choice of stable and unstable eigenvalues implies a range of values of
policy-rule parameters for a given policy-transmission mechanism which is labeled de-
terminacy area. This determinacy area corresponds to policy advice for policy-rule pa-
rameters. This third implication is an outcome of Wonhams (1967) theorem. For a
controllable system, the parameters of the characteristic polynomial determining these
eigenvalues are a¢ ne functions of policy-rule parameters. Eigenvalues within the unit
circle correspond to a bounded interval of values specic to each policy-rule parame-
ter. Conversely, the values of each policy rule-parameter outside their specic bounded
interval corresponds to eigenvalues outside the unit circle.
What is missing, however, in some of the seminal papers using simple rules (Leeper
(1991), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003), Gali (2015)), is the discussion
of why the policy instrument is a forward-looking variable instead of a "backward-looking"
or "predetermined" variable when its responds to the deviations of forward-looking policy
targets from their set point. From their computation of the number of stable eigenval-
ues, the reader can only infer that they implicitly assumed that policy instruments are
always forward-looking for simple rules. If policy instruments are counted as predeter-
mined variables, the number of eigenvalues inside the unit circle increases. The range
of values of policy rule-parameters leading to determinacy is di¤erent. Finally, policy
recommendations are di¤erent.
The second contribution of this paper is to highlight the consequences of assum-
ing policy instruments forward-looking instead of predetermined for a simple rule with
forward-looking policy targets. We consider the new-Keynesian Phillips curve as a mone-
tary policy transmission mechanism (Gali (2015)). There is an extreme lack of robustness
and of credibility if one assumes that policy instrument is forward-looking when at least
one policy target is forward-looking in a proportional feedback simple rule.
Cochrane (2019, p.345) expressed his concern of the lack of robustness and of credi-
bility:
To produce those equilibria, the central bank commits that if ination gets
going, the bank will decrease interest rates, and by doing so it will increase
subsequent ination, without bound. Likewise, should ination be less than
the central bank wishes, it will drive the economy down to the liquidity trap...
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No central bank on this planet describes its ination-control e¤orts this way.
They uniformly explain the opposite. Should ination get going, the bank will
increase interest rates in order to reduce subsequent ination. It will induce
stability into an unstable economy, not the other way around. I have not seen
selecting among multiple equilibria on any central banks descriptions of what
it does... That the central bank will react to ination by pushing the economy
to hyperination seems an even more tenuous statement about peoples beliefs,
today and in any sample period we might study, than it is about actual central
bank behavior.
The assumption of forward-looking policy instruments for forward-looking policy tar-
gets in a simple rule corresponds to the complete lack of credibility of the policy maker.
This makes sense: If a policy maker does not care at all about the future in his loss func-
tion and in the policy transmission mechanism, he does not care to leave the economy with
locally unstable dynamics of policy targets on future dates. Local unstability will markedly
increases his loss function in the near future if he does not know the parameters of the
policy transmission mechanism with an innite precision. Conversely, policy rules which
destabilize the future dynamics of policy targets are not credible for the private sector.
With some credibility, the initial value of the current policy instrument (the funds
rate) anchors the initial value of the forward-looking policy target (ination) using the
feedback rule. Hence, there is no longer the indeterminacy of initial ination. Therefore,
it does not make sense to destabilize ination dynamics to rule out indeterminacy. It
follows that the assumption of forward-looking policy instruments for forward-looking
policy targets provides useless policy recommendations for policy makers who are usually
willing to care about the future.
Including ad-hoc equations such as a simple proportional feedback rule for some agents
without leads or lags of the policy instruments, leads to ambiguous and misleading results
in rational expectations models. Therefore, introducing an asymmetry between a ratio-
nal private sector doing intertemporal optimization and an ad-hoc policy rule for policy
makers is not a good idea. Modeling the rational behavior of the policy maker would
have avoided these lacks of robustness and credibility.
Accordingly, assuming the policy instrument to be backward-looking may correspond
to a reduced form of the optimal model of limited commitment, when the policy maker
has a non-zero probability to take into account private sectors expectations (Roberds
(1989), Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007))). This maintains an order of stable dynamics
(a number of stable eigenvalues inside the unit circle) which corresponds the order of the
dynamics of the private sectors policy targets. This guarantees the local stability of the
dynamics in the space of the policy targets.
To sum up, the lack of robustness and of credibility of simple rules is an artefact
grounded by a never discussed conventional assumption: policy instruments are assumed
to be forward-looking when they respond to forward-looking policy targets in proportional
feedback simple rules.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section two recalls the mathematical proper-
ties of dynamical models putting a special importance on the concepts of predetermined
versus non-predetermined variables, determinacy versus indeterminacy, feedback rules,
and the convention of dening the policy instrument as a forward-looking variable. Sec-
tion three compares the policy makers solutions assuming either the policy instrument
to be predetermined or to be backward-looking for a new-Keynesian Phillips curve and
a cost-push shock transmission mechanism. Section four concludes.
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2 Mathematical modeling and economic interpreta-
tion
2.1 Predetermined versus non-predetermined variables
One of the rst questions when choosing the variables in an economic model is the question
of whether these variable are predetermined or not. Some variables, such as the stock of
capital, seem to be natural candidates for predetermined variables, for others the decision
is more di¢ cult. From a mathematical point of view, any variable can be predetermined
or non-predetermined. Blanchard and Kahns (1980) start their analysis of a dynamical
system stating that the matrices A and  of their dynamic model are ad hoc given
matrices, i.e. not derived from intertemporal optimal choice. The transition matrix A
has a given number n of stable eigenvalues inside the unit circle and a remaining number
m of unstable eigenvalues outside the unit circle. They dene predetermined (backward-
looking) variables and non-predetermined (forward-looking) variables and their model as
follows:
The model is given as follows:
Xt+1
tPt+1

= A

Xt
Pt

+ Zt; Xt=0 = X0 (1)
where X is an (n 1) vector of variables predetermined at t; P is an (m 1)
vector of variables non-predetermined at t; Z is an (k  1) vector of exogenous
variables; tPt+1 is the agents expectations of Pt+1 held at t; A, are (n+m)
(n+m) and a (n+m) k matrices, respectively.
tPt+1 = Et (Pt+1 p 
t) : (2)
where Et () is the mathematical expectation operator; 
t is the information
set at date t,.... A predetermined variable is a function only of variables
known at date t, that is of variables in 
t that Xt+1 = tXt+1 whatever the
realization of the variables in 
t+1. A non-predetermined variable can be
a function of any variable in 
t+1, so that we can conclude that Pt+1 = tPt+1
only if the realization of all variables in 
t+1 are equal to their expectations
conditional on 
t. Blanchard and Kahn (1980), p.1305.
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) thus assume that the property of whether a variable
is predetermined or forward-looking and their respective numbers n and m is given.
In practice, they allow that n, m, n, m are discretionary ad hoc choices done by the
researcher as it is done by other ad hoc linear rational expectations models of the 1970s.
As an example they give an ad hoc multiplier accelerator model including only one non-
predetermined (or forward-looking or jump) variable: output (example 4). They show
that a researcher can choose which variable is a predetermined or a non-predetermined
variable and that this choice is independent from an economic criterion such as real versus
nominal variables (p.1307):
This example also shows the absence of necessary connection between
"real," "nominal" and "predetermined," "non-predetermined".
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Set aside this sentence, Blanchard and Kahns (1980) paper does not provide any cri-
terion for deciding when a variable is forward-looking or not. In their example of the mul-
tiplier accelerator model, the demand components of output: consumption, investment
and government expenditures may all have been assumed to depend on forward-looking
specic expectations of consumption, investment and government expenditures, instead
of depending only on aggregate output expectations.
2.2 Optimal control and feedback rule
The next choice of the researcher when modeling monetary policy concerns the type of
feedback rule of the central bank. Currie and Levine (1985), Leeper (1991), Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003) and Gali (2015) add to Blanchard and Kahns (1980)
dynamic system at least one policy instrument it with non-zero correlation (B 6= 0) with
policy targets (Xt;Pt):
Xt+1
tPt+1

= A

Xt
Pt

+ Zt +Bit; Xt=0 = X0: (3)
In their examples, Kalman controllability, i.e. the property that policy instruments
have a direct of indirect e¤ect on the policy target, is satised:
rank
 
B;AB;A2B; :::An+m 1B

= n+m:
The policy makers rule is assume to be an ad hoc (behavioral) proportional feedback
rule or "simple rule" with policy-rule parameters FX , FP and FX :
it = FXXt + FPPt + FZZt: (4)
Restrictions on the policy-rule parameters are often imposed. For example, Leepers
(1991) interest-rate rule responds only to forward-looking ination and to an exogenous
auto-regressive variable (FX = 0).
These proportional feedback rules exhibit no dynamics:
- The policy instrument it does not depend on its lagged values it 1; it 2::. It is not
included in the set of predetermined variables in the rst row of Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) system: Xt+1 = AnnXt+ ::: where Ann is the upper left nn square block matrix
in matrix of matrix A.
- The policy instrument it does not depends on its expected value: tit+1 = Et (it+1). It
is not included in the set of non-predetermined (forward-looking) variables in the second
row of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) system: tPt+1 = AmmPt + ::: where Amm is the
bottom right mm square (block matrix of matrix A.
The following choice of a policy rule, however, would allow the policy instrument to
be forward looking or backward looking:
it = FXXt + FPPt + FZZt + 1it 1 + 2it 2 + :::+ b1Et (it+1) : (5)
If the policy instrument depends on its lagged value i 6= 0 and not on its expectation
b1 = 0, then it is a backward-looking variable. If the variable does not depend on its
lagged value i = 0, but it depends on its expected value b1 6= 0 and the expectations
are not adaptive expectations, i.e. its expected value does not depend on the current and
lagged values of the policy instrument so that they "cause" the current value it, then it is
a forward-looking variable. In the hybrid case, where the policy instrument does depend
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on its lagged value i 6= 0 and also on its expected value b1 6= 0, the policy instrument it
is still assumed to be forward-looking variable (Chatelain and Ralf (2018)).
If the feedback rule has no dynamics such that i = 0 and b1 = 0, the above cited
denitions of predetermined versus non-predetermined variables of Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) do not imply that the policy instrument is forward-looking when at least one
policy target is forward-looking.
2.3 Determinacy versus indeterminacy
An important feature of a rational expectations equilibrium in a dynamic model is the
indeterminacy or determinacy of the perfect foresight dynamics. Determinacy requires
the steady state equilibrium to be locally unique, whereas in the case of indeterminacy a
large number of nonstationary solutions of the dynamical system converging to the steady
state exist. Then it is for the individual of no importance which future state of nature
he expects because for any choice of todays actions the economy approaches the steady
state, no rational decision is possible. To avoid this kind of ambiguity, Blanchard and
Kahn (1980) set a stability boundary condition in the innite horizon, like the innite
horizon transversality conditions assumed in optimal control and derive conditions for
determinacy, indeterminacy and for a bounded solution:
This condition in e¤ect rules out exponential growth of the expectations
of Xt+1 and Pt+1 held at time t. (This in particular rules out "bubbles"...).
Blanchard and Kahn (1980), p.1307.
Proposition 1: If m = m, i.e., if the number of eigenvalues of A outside
the unit circle is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables, then
there exists a unique solution. Blanchard and Kahn (1980), p.1308.
Proposition 2: If m < m, i.e., if the number of eigenvalues of A outside
the unit circle exceeds the number of non-predetermined variables, there is
solution satisfying both (1) and the non-explosion condition. Blanchard and
Kahn (1980), p.1308.
Proposition 3: If m > m, i.e., if the number of eigenvalues of A outside
the unit circle is less than the number of non-predetermined variables, there
is an innity of solutions. Blanchard and Kahn (1980), p.1308.
Optimal intertemporal choice models always satisfy the determinacy condition under
adequate concavity and boundary conditions: this has been proven in papers of optimal
control before Blanchard and Kahn (1980), such as Vaughan (1970) and Kalman (1960).
Blanchard and Kahns (1980) solution is an extension to ad hoc models (not derived from
maximization) of Vaughan (1970) solution of the maximization of a quadratic function
subject to linear constraints (linear quadratic regulator, LQR).
How likely are we to have m = m in a particular model? It may be
that the system described by (1) is just the set of necessary conditions for
maximization of a quadratic function subject to linear constraints. In this
case, the matrix A will have more structure than we have imposed here, and
the condition m = m will always hold. Blanchard and Kahn (1980), p.1309.
The matrix A2n of the Hamiltonian system of the LQR is symplectic (its transpose
is equivalent to its inverse), which implies n = m. Its number n of eigenvalues inside
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is the unit circle is equal to its number m of eigenvalues outside the unit circle. This
number is equal to its number n of predetermined state variables and its number m = n
of non-predetermined costate variables.
The linear quadratic model is also a local approximation around an equilibrium of non-
quadratic non-linear optimal control problems such as optimal saving and optimal growth
models under adequate concavity assumptions. These optimal saving and optimal growth
models can be solved by the Lagrange method (but not necessarily) with Hamiltonian
systems having the same saddle-point property as the linear quadratic regulator:
The condition m = m is also clearly related to the strict saddle point
property discussed in the context of growth models: the above proposition
(1) states in e¤ect that a unique solution will exist if and only if A has the
strict saddle point property. Blanchard and Kahn (1980), p.1309.
Since Blanchard and Kahn (1980) has been published, the macroeconomic theory
of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models shifted to models based on
intertemporal optimization of the private sector agents linearized around an equilibrium.
Hence, Blanchard and Kahns (1980) determinacy condition is always fullled for the
private sector part of the new-Keynesian DSGE models or models of the scal theory of
the price level.
Blanchard and Kahns (1980) determinacy condition is only a contribution which
matters for ad hoc linear models including forward-looking variables. In linearized DSGE
models, Blanchard and Kahns (1980) indeterminacy condition only matters because of
the assumption of policy makers ad hoc proportional feedback rule ("simple rules") such
as a Taylor or funds-rate rule.
2.4 The Convention of a Policy Instrument as a Forward-Looking
Variable: Leeper (1991)
Leepers (1991) is one of the rst papers where the private sector follows an explicit
optimal intertemporal behaviour and where the policy maker behaviour is described by
proportional feedback rule. This seminal paper is an example of how was set the conven-
tion that a policy instrument is a forward-looking variable when at least one of its policy
target is forward-looking in the simple proportional feedback rule.
Leeper (1991) considers an intertemporal frictionless consumption model where the
representative household receives every period a constant endowment of consumption
goods and saves in public debt or in money. There is no production. Lump-sum taxes
and nominal rates of return on bonds can vary over time.
Public debt is a private sector state variable. The accounting stock ow equation
for public debt does not involve expected values. Public debt can be deduced to be a
predetermined variable even though Leeper does not state this explicitly nor gives its
initial condition.
Consumption is the private sector optimal decision variable. It is related to a costate
variable. Because the endowment of consumption goods is the same for every period,
consumption is also the same in all periods. The Euler conditions boils down to a Fisher
equation. The nominal return on bonds less expected ination is equal to the time-
invariant households real discount rate.
Final boundary (transversality) conditions are assumed for the stocks of real debt
and real balances, but not for ination. The model is frictionless in the sense that
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prices are not set by households. Ination expectations are described as conditional
expectation taken with respect to an information set containing all current and past
individual variables. Hence, we deduce ination is a forward-looking variable.
Leeper introduces an ad hoc interest rate rule where the monetary authority sets
the current nominal rate as a function of current ination (which is a forward-looking
variable) and an auto-regressive shock with additive normal disturbances (which is a
backward-looking variable).
He introduces an ad hoc scal rule where the scal authority adjusts direct lump-sum
taxes in response to the level of real government debt outstanding (which is a backward-
looking variable) and to an auto-regressive shock (which is a backward-looking variable).
He substitutes the nominal rate by the interest rate rule in the Fisher equation.
Expected ination is correlated with current ination, after elimination of the nominal
rate. He substitutes lump-sum tax in the stock-ow accounting equation for public debt.
He then has two dynamic equations for predetermined public debt and for forward-looking
ination where the policy instruments (nominal funds rate and lump-sump taxes) have
been eliminated. He states "A su¢ cient condition for a unique saddle-path equilibrium is
that one root of the system lies inside the unit circle and one root lies outside [Blanchard
and Kahn (1980)]". At this stage only, we deduce that the nominal rates and lump-sum
taxes have been assumed to be forward-looking, without any explanation.
This assumption and the determinacy condition implies one root of the system lying
inside the unit circle and one root outside the unit circle instead of two roots of the
system lying inside the unit circle. Leepers (1991) determinacy solution implies the local
instability of the policy targets dynamics in the space of dimension two of the two policy
targets (ination and public debt).
Finally, the stock of money is a function of the current nominal return without leads
or lags of money, hence, without dynamics. Later in the paper it is mentioned to have
an initial value. Hence, it is a predetermined variable, by contrast to policy instruments.
2.5 The Analogy of Game against Nature versus Dynamic Stack-
elberg game in Leeper (1991)
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) is a transpose by analogy to ad hoc models of Vaughan
(1970) optimal linear quadratic regulator solution, which corresponds to a game against
nature. A single agent is controlling the local stability of predetermined state variables
given by nature, using forward-looking co-state variables.
We can equally transpose by analogy the Stackelberg dynamic game optimal solution
also mentioned as Ramsey optimal policy since Kydland and Prescott (1980). The policy
maker is a leader minimizing a loss function which takes into account state variables (from
the point of view of the policy maker) which include private sectors predetermined state
variables and private sectors forward-looking (co-state) variables. The policy maker will
then have its own forward-looking co-state variables for the private sectors predetermined
state variables.
The policy makers co-state variable of a private sector co-state variable corresponds
to the marginal value of the policy makers loss function with respect to this private sector
co-state variable (for example, forward-looking ination). The policy maker rst-order
condition implies that the policy makers co-state variable of a private sector forward-
looking variable is predetermined at zero at the initial date. This optimal initial transver-
sality condition provides the initial value of the policy makers instrument and of the
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private sector forward-looking variable (for example ination). As a Stackelberg leader,
the policy maker decides (or anchors) optimally the initial value of private sectors jump
variables, using the initial value of his policy instrument, if he has at least a minimal
credibility.
Transposing Stackelberg dynamic game to a proportional feedback rule where the
policy instrument responds to at least one forward-looking private sector variable, the
analogy suggests that the policy instrument is a predetermined variable.
In Leepers model, the nominal rate is controlling the dynamics of forward-looking
ination. From the proportional feedback rule equation without leads or lags of nominal
rates, nothing forbids to assume that the nominal rate is a predetermined variable. Then,
the initial condition for ination is found inverting the rule: 0 = F 1i0 + F 1z0, where
z0 is the initial value of the monetary policy shock and F the policy rule parameter.
By contrast, lump-sum tax is controlling the dynamics of predetermined public debt.
The initial value of the lump-sum tax is then a forward-looking variable where the initial
value is given by the initial public debt and the initial value of the scal shock: 0 =
Gb0 + u0 where z0 is the initial value of the monetary policy shock and G the scal rule
parameter.
If one follows the analogy with a Stackelberg dynamic game, there are two predeter-
mined variables: the private sectors public debt and the policy makers funds rate. Two
roots of the system lie inside the unit circle and satisfy Blanchard and Kahns (1980)
determinacy condition. The dynamic system implies locally stable dynamics in the space
of the two policy target variables which has two dimensions.
3 Example: New-Keynesian Phillips curve
In order to clarify the possible choice of a policy instrument, we will present di¤erent
scenarios of forward-looking or predetermined instruments in a model where the trans-
mission mechanism is based on the New-Keynesian Phillips curve.
Some researchers may appeal to a criterion based on an analogy with another un-
derlying model in order to ground that policy instruments are forward-looking or pre-
determined. For example, the criterion: "The central bank can choose its funds rate
without any reference to the past" corresponds to the underlying model of discretion in
Gali (2015), chapter 5.
Conversely, the case for a predetermined policy instrument so that "The central bank
can choose its funds rate with some reference to the past" corresponds to Ramsey op-
timal policy under quasi-commitment (Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007)) where the
probability of not reneging commitment can be very close to zero, but not exactly zero
as it is the case in the discretion model.
3.1 Policy transmission mechanism
Following Gali (2015), the monetary policy transmission mechanism is derived from the
new-Keynesian Phillips curve:
t = Ett+1 + xt + zt where  > 0, 0 <  < 1, (6)
where xt represents the output gap, i.e. the deviation between (log) output and its
e¢ cient level. t denotes the rate of ination between periods t  1 and t.  denotes the
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discount factor. Et denotes the expectation operator. The cost push shock zt includes an
exogenous auto-regressive component:
zt = zt 1 + "t where 0 <  < 1 and "ti.i.d. normal N
 
0; 2"

; (7)
where  denotes the auto-correlation parameter and "t an exogenous shock, identi-
cally and independently distributed (i.i.d.) following a normal distribution with constant
variance 2" .
The transmission mechanism can be written:

Ett+1
zt+1

=

Ayy =
1

Ayz =   1
Azy = 0 Azz = 

t
zt

+

By =  
Bz = 0

xt +

0
1

"t+1: (8)
The system is already written in the Kalman canonical form which is dened such
that the bottom left block matrix of A is equal to zero Azy = 0 and the bottom block
matrix of B is zero: Bz = 0. It does not, however, satisfy the Kalman controllability
condition:
AB =

1

  1

0 
  

0

=
   
2
0

rank (BjAB) = rank
  

  
2
0 0

= 1 < n = 2:
To make the system controllable two additional assumptions can be made. Assump-
tion 1: Considering only the rst equation, there is one policy target, n = 1, which leads
to the Kalman controllability condition: rank (By) = rank

 


= n = 1, if  

6= 0.
If we assume that the slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve is not equal to zero:
 6= 0, then ination is controllable by the output gap. There is a non-zero correlation
between the policy instrument (output gap ut) and the expected value of the policy target
(ination Ett+1).
Assumption 2: Considering only the second equation, the Kalman controllability
condition is: rank (Bz) = rank (0) = 0 < 1. The cost-push shock is not controllable
by the output gap. There is a zero correlation between the policy instrument (output
gap ut) and the future value of the cost-push forcing variable zt+1. If we assume that
the non-controllable cost-push forcing variable is stationary, 0 < Azz =  < 1, then the
dynamic system including both equations can be stabilized.
3.2 Simple rule with a predetermined policy instrument
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Gali (2015, chapter 5) label a rule where the policy
instrument is the output gap xt and the policy target is forward-looking ination a "tar-
geting" rule. The policy maker follows a feedback rule where the output gap does not
depend on its expectations nor on its lagged values:
xt = Ft + Fzzt:
After substitution of the policy rule, we get the following "closed loop" linear system:
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
Ett+1
zt+1

=

SR =
1 F

 1 Fz

0 

t
zt

+

0
1

"t+1:
When the policy instrument is pegged at its long run optimal value xt = 0 at all dates
(F = Fz = 0), the dynamics is dened as "open-loop dynamics". Because 1 > 1, the
open-loop dynamics of ination is unstable.
Let us assume that the policy instrument is predetermined with a given initial value
of the policy instrument x0 and of the auto-regressive cost-push shock z0. Blanchard
and Kahns (1980) determinacy condition implies two stable eigenvalues. As 0 <  < 1,
this implies
1 F  < 1. As a denition, "negative feedback" values of the policy rule
parameter F are such that the closed-loop system has stable dynamics. Blanchard and
Kahns (1980) determinacy condition implies the following "determinacy set" DNF for
the negative-feedback values of the policy-rule parameter for given parameters of the
transmission mechanism (; ):
F 2 DNF =

F 2 R such that
1  F
 < 1  = 1   ; 1 + 

:
Finally, the policy rule allows to nd the initial value of the forward-looking variable.
x0 = F0 + Fzz0 ) 0 = F 1 0   F 1 Fzz0.
The dynamic system is given in table 1 on the row where x0 is known.
3.3 Ramsey optimal policy with quasi commitment
Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) introduce a sequence of policy regimes indexed by j,
in which a policy maker j may re-optimize, i.e. minimize again its loss function, on each
future period with exogenous probability 1   q strictly below one. The length of their
tenure or regime" depends on a sequence of exogenous i.i.d. Bernoulli signals ftgt0
with Et [t]t0 = 1   q, with 0 < q < 1. If t = 1; a new policy maker indexed by k
takes o¢ ce at the beginning of time t, otherwise the policy maker j stays on. A higher
probability q can be interpreted as a higher credibility. Starting from regime j till a
regime change to k, the policy maker maximizes the following function:
V jk (u0) =  E0
t=+1X
t=0
(q)t

1
2

2t +

"
x2t

+  (1  q)V jk (ut)

; (9)
s.t. t = xt + qEtt+1 +  (1  q)Etkt+1 + zt (Lagrange multiplier t+1)
zt = zt 1 + t,8t 2 N, z0 given.
The loss function corresponds to households welfare with  = 
"
> 0, where " = 

> 1
is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods (Gali (2015)). The policy
target is ination and the policy instrument is the output gap (Gali (2015)). The utility of
the central bank if next period objectives change is denoted V jk. Ination expectations
depend on two terms. The rst term with weight q, is the ination that would prevail
under the current regime j to which the central bank has made a commitment to. The
second term with weight 1   q, is the ination that would be implemented under the
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alternative regime k, which is taken as exogenous by the current central bank. The key
change is that the narrow range of values for the discount factor usually around 0:99 for
quarterly data (4% discount rate) is much wider for the "credibility weighted discount
factor" of the policy maker: q 2 ]0; 0:99]. A policy maker with lower credibility gives
more weight to the present and near future welfare losses.
Di¤erentiating the Lagrangian with respect to the policy instrument (output gap xt)
and to the policy target (ination t) yields the rst order conditions:
@L
@t
= 0 : t + t+1   t = 0
@L
@xt
= 0 : 
"
xt   t+1 = 0 )

xt = xt 1   "t
xt = "t+1 = "(t   t)
t = 1; 2; ::: The central banks Euler equation ( @L
@t
= 0) links recursively the future
or current value of central banks policy instrument xt to its current or past value xt 1,
because the central banks relative cost of changing her policy instrument is strictly
positive x = " > 0. This non-stationary Euler equation adds an unstable eigenvalue
when analyzing the central banks Hamiltonian system including three laws of motion of
one forward-looking variable (ination t) and of two predetermined variables (zt; xt) or
(zt; t).
Using Chatelain and Ralfs (2019) algorithm, the root of the dynamic system, that
we denote "ination eigenvalue" , is inside an interval belonging to the unit circle for
" 2 ]1;+1[:
 =
1  F
q
=
1
2

1 +
1
q
+
"
q

 
s
1
4

1 +
1
q
+
"
q
2
  1
q
2

0;
1
q

:
The optimal policy-rule parameters of a linear quadratic optimal program do not
depend on the initial conditions (x0; 0; z0) (Simon (1956)) but only on policy transmis-
sion mechanism parameters (; ) and on the policy makers cost of changing the policy
instrument ( > 0):
F  =
1  q

= "

1   and F

z =
 1
1  qF

 :
This leads to a smaller set DNF  DNF when varying the policy makers preferences
for " 2 ]1;+1[:
F  2 DNF =

F  (") 2 R such that 0 <
1  F  (")
q
<
1
q
for " 2 ]1;+1[

 DNF :
The natural boundary condition minimizes the loss function and leads to an optimal
choice of the policy instrument at the initial date. This rst order condition is equivalent
to state that the Lagrange multiplier (co-state variable) of forward-looking ination t
is a backward-looking variable. It is predetermined at its optimal value equal to zero at
the initial date. Because the Lagrange multiplier of ination is a function of the policy
instrument, this implies that the policy instrument is optimally predetermined at the
initial date at the value x0:
@L
@t

=0
= 0 = 

0 = 0) x0 =  "

1  z0:
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The policy rule is used to anchor initial ination 0 on the policy instrument and the
initial value of the autoregressive shock:
0 = F
 1
 x

0   F  1 F z z0 =  
1
"
x0 =

1  z0:
Expected impulse response functions are given in table 1. For given values of the
policy parameter  > 0 and of transmission parameters (; ), Ramsey optimal policy
has reduced form rule parameters which are observationally equivalent to the ones of a
simple rule such that F = F  2 DNF , Fz = F z , and a backward-looking (predetermined)
policy instrument such that its initial value is x0 = x0.
Lets now do a thought experiment assuming that ination is a backward-looking
variable with known initial value 0 (in mathematics, an "essential natural condition").
The recursive dynamics of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve can now be interpreted as
backward-looking, assuming expected ination is caused by the lagged value of ination.
The only change for optimal policy is that an initial boundary condition is an essential
boundary condition 0 = 0 instead of a natural boundary condition. This does not
change the optimal values of the policy rule parameters (F  ; F

z ) which do not depend on
initial values (x0; 0; z0). In this case, the optimal policy rule determines the initial value
of the policy instrument, knowing the initial value of the policy target:
x0 = F

0 + F

z z0:
To sum up, if ination is forward-looking, its Lagrange multiplier is optimally pre-
determined. The optimal decision of x0 according to the natural boundary conditions
anchors initial ination 0 using the optimal policy feedback rule.
Conversely, if we do the thought experiment that ination is backward-looking, its
policy makers Lagrange multiplier is forward-looking. The optimal initial value of the
policy instrument x0 is found using the optimal policy feedback rule: it jumps as a
forward-looking variable.
3.4 Simple rule with forward-looking policy instrument
In the next step, we assume that both, the policy target and the policy instrument, are
forward-looking variables without initial values. The cost-push forcing variable is then
the only predetermined variable. Blanchard and Kahns (1980) determinacy condition
leads to the requirement that one eigenvalue should lie strictly inside the unit circle and
one eigenvalue outside the unit circle for the closed-loop system. The eigenvalue of the
cost push shock is assumed to be inside the unit circle 0 <  < 1. Then the policy rule
parameter F for given transmission parameters  and , should be chosen such that the
eigenvalue of the ination dynamics of the closed loop system is outside the unit circle:
SR =
1 F

> 1 or 1 F

<  1. These "positive-feedback" values of the policy-rule
parameter enforces the local instability of the closed-loop dynamical system of dimension
two.
This implies the following "positive-feedback determinacy set" DPF which is the com-
plement of the determinacy set RnDNF = DNF with respect to the case when the policy
instrument is backward-looking.
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F 2 DPF = DNF =

F 2 R such that
1  F
  1 )
DNF =

 1; 1  


[

1 + 

;+1

.
For given values of the transmission mechanism (; ), the policy-rule parameter F is
a bifurcation parameter. Indeed, if (; ) are not given, they are also bifurcation parame-
ters of the closed-loop system. However, the common practice in new-Keynesian models is
to present the determinacy sets DPF for the feedback-rule parameters (Woodford (2003)).
When F =
1 

+ , with  a small real number, shifts with a small change to
F =
1 

  , the dynamical system shifts from having  = 1 F

< 1 to   1 which
corresponds to a saddle-node bifurcation. When F =
1+

  , with  a small real
number, shifts with a small change to F =
1+

+ , the dynamic system shifts from
having  >  1 to    1 which corresponds to a ip bifurcation. A bifurcation is a
qualitative change of the behavior of the dynamical system.
Both, ination and the policy instrument (output gap), have to be proportional to
the cost-push auto-regressive forcing variable. Then, for identication the policy rule Fz
has to be restricted to zero, as it is useless to respond to two variables when the dynamics
evolves in a space of dimension one. Using Blanchard and Kahns (1980) method, the
solution is given by the slope of the eigenvectors of the given stable eigenvalue 0 <  < 1
of the cost-push shock:
1 F

  1

0 

t
zt

= 

t
zt

)

1  F

  

t =
1

zt: (10)
The solution is such that:
t =
1

1 F

  zt =
1
1  F    zt and xt =
1

F
1 F

  zt for t = 0; 1; 2; :::
The dynamical system is given in table 1 on the third row with x0 unknown.
3.5 Discretion
If the policy maker re-optimizes with certainty in each future periods we call this an
innite-horizon zero-credibility policy. This zero-credibility policy is labeled "discre-
tionary policy" (Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999)). It is equivalent to the optimal simple
rule for the new-Keynesian Phillips curve.
When the probability of not reneging commitment is exactly zero (q = 0), the policy
makers loss function boils down to a static utility ((; 0)0 = 1, (; 0)t = 0; t = 1; 2; :::):
the policy maker only values the current instantaneous period, as he knows he will be
replaced next period, whatever the duration of the next period:
V jk (u0) =  E0
t=+1X
t=0
(q)t

1
2

2t +

"
x2t

+  (1  q)V jk (ut)

=  1
2

20 +

"
x20

:
14
In the transmission mechanism, the policy maker knows for sure that another policy
maker will take his o¢ ce. For him, the new-Keynesian Phillips curve boils down to a
static Phillips curve where he sets a probability zero of taking into account expected
ination:
s.t. 0 = x0 + v0 + (; 0)Et1 where v0 =  (1  0)E0

k1

+ u0 with u0 given.
Gali (2015) interprets this term as follows: "the term vt = Et [t+1] + zt is taken
as given by the monetary authority, because zt is exogenous and Et

kt+1

is a function
of expectations about future output gaps (as well as future zts) which, by assumption,
cannot be currently inuenced by the policymaker".
As expected ination is not taken into account by the policy maker j, this removes
one order in the dynamics of ination in the transmission mechanism, which removes
one dimension of the dynamical system. Shifting from a dynamic new-Keynesian Phillips
curve to a static Phillips curve is the origin of the bifurcation of the dynamical system be-
tween the case of extreme discretion (q = 0) and the alternative case of quasi-commitment
(q 2 ]0; 1]), where at least a non-zero weight is set on expected ination by the policy
maker.
The optimality condition implies a policy rule with perfect negative correlation of
the policy instrument (output gap) with the policy target (ination) with a constant
parameter given by the opposite of the households elasticity of substitution between
goods:
xt = Ft with F =  
"
=  " 2 DPF = ] 1; 1[ because " 2 ]1;+1[ , for t = 0; 1; 2; :::
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Gali (2015), chapter 5, assume that both, the
policy instrument and the policy target, are forward looking and that the cost-push shock
is the only predetermined variable. Then Blanchard and Kahns (1980) determinacy
solution is given by the unique slope of the eigenvectors of the given stable eigenvalue
0 <  < 1 of the cost-push shock:
1

+ 

"   1

0 

t
zt

= 

t
zt

)

1

+


"  

t =
1

zt: (11)
The discretion solution for the policy target and the policy instrument are both pro-
portional to the only predetermined variable: the cost-push auto-regressive shock:
t =

1
1  + "

zt and xt =  "

1
1  + "

zt. (12)
When varying the policy makers preferences (" 2 ]1;+1[), a subset DPF of the
positive-feedback determinacy set DPF of the policy-rule parameters is the same as for
the simple rule, assuming that both, the policy target and the policy instrument, are
forward-looking which corresponds to a reduced form of discretion:
F 2 DPF = ] 1; 1[  DPF = DNF =

 1; 1  


[

1 + 

;+1

The assumption of forward-looking policy instrument for forward-looking policy tar-
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get corresponds to a policy makers static model where the weight on the private sector
rational expectations is zero. When setting his policy instrument, the central banker does
not care at all about the future.
3.6 Bifurcation and robustness
For all nonzero probabilities of the policy maker to remain in o¢ ce, fq 2 ]0; 1]g, the
monetary policy corresponds to Ramsey optimal policy under quasi-commitment. Even
an extremely small level of credibility (e.g. a probability of not reneging commitment
equal to 10 7) still involves taking into account the expectations of ination by the policy
maker. This means taking into account an additional dimension of the dynamical system
(order two) as compared to extreme discretion. Only the event fq = 0g corresponds to a
Dirac distribution, with a zero prior probability for this event.
With quasi-commitment, the probability of not reneging commitment can be innitely
small (near-zero credibility), but it remains strictly positive: for example, q = 10 7 > 0
with q 2 ]0; 1], hence q 2 ]0; 0:99]. The following table 1 compares the solutions of the
di¤erent scenarios of backward or forward looking instruments and targets:
Table 1: Expected impulse response functions: Backward-looking policy instrument,
Ramsey optimal policy, forward-looking policy instrument.
Expected impulse response functions following z0 1 F F 2 Fz
x0 given

t
zt

=

1 F

=    1

  

Fu
0 
t  F 1 Fzz0   F 1 x0
z0

jIBLj < 1 DNF 2 E(1)
x0 =  " 1 z0

t
zt

=

1 F

=    1

  

Fu
0 
t 
1 z0
z0

0 <  < 1 D  DNF  1 qF
x0 unknown

t
zt

=

1 F

= IFL   1
0 
t 1=
IFL z0
z0

jIFLj > 1 DNF 0
Discretion

t
zt

=

1 F

= D   1
0 
t 1=
IFL z0
z0

DD  DNF 0
Table 2 shows numerical examples for the di¤erent scenarios.
Table 2: Expected impulse response functions for  = 0:8,  = 0:99, " = 6,  =
0:1275 obtained with  = 2=3, 1  L = 2=3,  = 1 and ' = 1.
Expected impulse response functions following z0 1 F F 2 Fz
x0 = 0:65z0 given

t
zt

=

0:43  0:13
0 0:8
t  F 1 Fzz0   F 1 x0
z0

0:43 < 1 4:51 2 DNF  6:83
x0 =  " 1 z0

t
ut

=

0:43  0:13
0 0:8
t
0:65
1

z0 0:43 < 1 4:51 2 DNF  6:83
x0 unknown

t
ut

=

1:78  1:01
0 0:8
t
1:03
1

z0 1:78 > 1  6 2 DNF 0
Discretion

t
ut

=

1:78  1:01
0 0:8
t
1:03
1

z0 1:78 > 1  6 =2 DNF 0
Giordani and Söderlind (2006) demonstrated that the simple-rule solution with forward-
looking policy instruments and forward-looking policy targets does not satisfy robustness
to misspecication as dened by Hansen and Sargent (2008). The evil agent of robust
control trying to fool the policy maker as much as he can is turned into the most helpful
angel agent which tries to help as much as he can the policy maker to save his locally un-
stable path in the space of policy target variables. Macroeconomists advise policy makers
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that the local instability of the dynamics of the policy makers state variables is necessary
in order to achieve macroeconomic stabilization. This solution is turning upside down
the theories of classic, optimal and robust control and of Stackelberg dynamic games.
Its policy recommendations have zero robustness and zero credibility (Cochrane (2019)
p.345).
The uncertainty on the knowledge of parameters is strictly restricted, so that the
local instability of the equilibrium in the space of n state variables of the solution with
forward-looking hypothesis does not matter. A shock on one parameter is instantaneously
o¤set by another shock on another parameter (by the virtue of the angel agent) so that
the dynamics of the n state variables remains in a stable subset of dimension m < n.
In our example, assume that the policy rule F is chosen by the policy maker and
the stable subspace projection parameter G anchoring ination on the non-observable
cost-push auto-regressive shock is chosen by the private sector.
t = Gzt and xt = Ft with G =
1
1  F    :
This solution remains stable only if the uncertainty on the parameters , and 
satises this restriction:
 =
1
F

1
G
+    1

:
A deviation of  should be instantaneously compensated by a deviation of  so
that G and F remain unchanged. There is the underlying assumption of a angel agent
who creates an exact negative-feedback correlation between exogenous shocks. Hence, the
local instability in the space of policy targets of dimension two does not change the stable
dynamics of ination and of the policy instrument in a subspace of dimension one. When
, ,  vary in continuous intervals of real numbers, this restriction has a probability equal
to zero. Robustness of misspecication can also be ruled out by assuming the knowledge
of all the parameters of the policy transmission mechanism with innite precision.
4 Conclusion
After having analyzed the di¤erent scenarios of forward or backward looking policy in-
struments and their relation to the policy targets, we will propose two criteria for choosing
the appropriate economic model. The rst concerns the robustness of the model:
Criterion 1 A model of policy makers behavior should provide policy recommendations
which are robust to misspecication when the policy maker is facing uncertainty on the
values of the parameters of the economy. A necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition is to
use negative-feedback policy rule parameters.
The second criterion concerns the way the central banks behavior is modeled. Sim-
ple rules with proportional feedback as used in New-Keynesian DSCG models where a
policy instrument responds to forward-looking policy targets does not imply that policy
instruments are forward-looking variables. These models are sometimes considered to
have better theoretical foundations due to optimal behavior with respect to agent-based
models using behavioral simple rules. Consistency implies that this argument of the ra-
tional micro-foundation of optimal choice should also apply to the policy maker. The
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rst best method is to abandon once and for all ambiguous simple-rule models and to
shift to models of Ramsey optimal policy under quasi-commitment. If simple rules are
still assumed as a second best theory, the outcome of their model should be as close as
possible to Ramsey optimal policy under quasi-commitment.
Criterion 2 Simple-rule parameters should be reduced forms of the rules of Ramsey op-
timal policy under quasi-commitment, which would imply a minimal robustness to mis-
specication and a minimal credibility of stabilization policy.
As seen in the example, this criterion can be satised with the backward-looking
hypothesis for a range of values of the policy-rule parameters.
This paper suggest that new-Keynesian DSGE models and the scal theory of the
price level are currently locked in to the inferior technology path of having chosen the
convention of forward-looking policy instrument if policy targets are forward-looking, as it
happened for QWERTY typewriter keyboard with respect to DVORAK (David (1985)).
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